The crumbling economy North Korea nurtures is a very fast dying out phenomena ever recorded just after multiple sanctions attributed by US and international bodies. Practically, the further nuclear show- off would be the worst suicidal step ever. To an extreme level, economical hungriness of North Korea reached; even its long-fasting remains unheard to the rest of the globe.
Let us exemplify the inherent starvation North Korea necessarily has been facing by an instance.
The question of who will pay the cost of Kim Jung Un’s and his delegation’s housing in Singapore squarely carries the evidence of how weak North Korean economy is. The US intends to cover the cost, but hopes the host country to bear.
Given the situation, inclining to the dialogue process with the US and relying on South Korea to tie the US in diplomatic track was only option so far remained opened to this secluded state. Even so, North Korea squarely ventures to buy a big burger bartering its nuclear weapons, the last wicket to use.
The strategic diplomatic moves of North Korea to China, and more recently Russia, aims at sharpening each of its bargaining moves to maximize the possibility of reaching two specific goals: Putting pressure on the US to lower its expectation in Singapore Summit and binding China and Russia with a deliberate friendly-rope to border on both.
The newly developed proximity North Korea is nurturing with China and Russia is equipping itself to strengthening its regular diplomatic steps, but not necessarily satiating its empty stomach.
The myth — China is enough to keep any territory economically safe ignoring the West — does not get North Korea out of its multi-faceted economical disability; indeed this so-called myth remains a myth.
Rather, the Chinese proverb ‘Give a man a fish, you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, you feed him for a lifetime’ has quietly been relevant in the contexts of North Korea’s survival process and its future economical journey.
China is still a big trading partner of North Korea. Due to shared border, China barter goods with North Korea even though trading embargoes for decades or so existed. China’s happiness for bartering with non-nuclearised North Korea knew no limit. China possessing North Korea as a buffer state was attested in global community.
China aspired North Korea to be fed. The operating institutional mechanism required to learn ‘How to fish’ did go beyond China’s week superpower.
Encountering the nine economical devastating sanctions imposed on North Korea shuttered all options for China, even ‘feeding fishes’ to North Korea. Those sanctions were simply counter measures to the aggressive nuclear weaponising processes North Korea was pursuing.
China, by and large aspires, a non-nuclearised state in the Far East, a geopolitically important region in turmoil in the modern world. The conflicts of China with its all neighbouring states, in particular, over maritime boundaries, are the most significant motivations for China not to want to live with any state nuclearised.
In addition, a hungry state like North Korea behaves quiet unpredictably as a hungry animal. Therefore it’s highly presumable that reining in the nuclearised North Korea is definitely a difficult job for China.
But, the mysteries of the mistrust between China and North Korea covertly exist in others area, some of them are historical and some are emerging due to the new geopolitical polarisation.
Since Mao Zedong’s time, China did not long for a de facto monarchy in North Korea. Mao blatantly criticised the plan of making Kim’s son, Kim Jong Il as the supreme leader of North Korea. Even China’s expectation today remains so and it necessarily irks North Korea.
The repugnance North Korea logically has to the expectation is, evident in its unnoticed persistent reactions to China. Mao Zedong is ignored in North Korea’s history, even though the grave of Mao’s son of Mao Zedong is still in the country.
Kim Jung-Un understands very well that China toys with a problem-ridden North Korea. In addition, it’s is using his country against the US.
Since roughly a year, the steps Pyongyang has been undertaking significantly indicate that it highly desires not to depend on a single country. This dormant dream of North Korea’s laying eggs in various baskets did not align with China’s manoeuvring policy for its own benefit.
North Korea’s relationship with China worsened after Pyongyang started enriching uranium and testing ICBMs, an apparent threat to the US, but a-long term deep threat to China.
North Korea adopted nuclear development strategies to get used to the rest of the world, not to remain to be dependent on a single country, like China.
While Pyongyang was getting into the deadly financial sanctions by the US and other international organisations one after another, its so-called survival helper, China, remained stoic. It did not play a single shot for North Korea — it’s most important geopolitical card.
China’s being silent made Kim Jung-Un very upset and the legacy of the historical mistrust between two communist countries reshaped. Even it’s believed that this stand-off with China led Kim Jung-Un order the killing of his uncle Jang Song-Thaek, who looked after North Korea-China relationship. The similar belief goes to the killings of Kim Jung-Nam, his step brother, who lived in Macau under Chinese protection.
Therefore, the question of whether ‘North Korea fully believes China’ is now rationalising the ways of our thought with respect to North Korea's being connected with open society.
Bijon Sarker is a political analyst and researcher